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 Abstract 
 
We study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the relationship between corporate 
governance and company performance. We consider 5 measures of corporate governance during 
the period 1998–2007. We find a significant negative relationship between board independence 
and operating performance during the pre-2002 period, but a positive and significant relationship 
during the post-2002 period. Our most important contribution is a proposal of a governance 
measure, namely, dollar ownership of the board members, that is simple, intuitive, less prone to 
measurement error, and not subject to the problem of weighting a multitude of governance 
provisions in constructing a governance index. 
 
 
 
∗Bhagat, sanjai.bhagat@colorado.edu, Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado at 
Boulder, UCB 419, Boulder, CO 80309; Bolton, bbolton@pdx.edu, School of Business Administration, Portland 
State University, PO Box 751, Portland, OR 97207. We thank Yaniv Grinstein (the referee), Paul Malatesta (the 
editor), Andrew Metrick, and seminar participants at Harvard University and American Finance Association 
meetings for constructive comments on a previous draft of this paper. The Internet Appendix and Excel files that 
contain the data used in this study can be found at the JFQA Web site (www.jfqa.org).
  
2 
 
INTERNET APPENDIX 
Robustness Checks 
Validity and Strength of Instruments 
 We conduct the Stock and Yogo (2004) test to ensure that our instruments are strong. We 
also perform the Hahn and Hausman (2002) weak instrument test, and the Hansen-Sargan 
overidentification test as discussed in Davidson and Mackinnon (2004); inferences from these 
tests are consistent with the reported Stock and Yogo test results. Detailed results are noted in 
Appendix A. 
Second, following the suggestion of Larcker and Rusticus (2009), we consider an 
alternate set of instruments in addition to the instruments noted above. Specifically, we consider 
(one year) lagged performance for performance, lagged ownership for ownership, and lagged 
leverage for leverage.1 Results using these instruments are consistent with the results reported 
above in Table 4.   
 Third, following the suggestions of Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) and Hall, Rudebusch 
and Wilcox (1996) we perform the Cragg-Donald test for model identification. The Cragg-
Donald test indicates that our system of equations is well-specified. 
 Fourth, we perform the Anderson-Rubin test suggested by Dufour (1997) to test the joint 
significance of the set of endogenous variables in our system of equations. The Anderson-Rubin 
test supports the joint significance of our set of endogenous variables. 
                                                        
1
 Kennedy (2003) notes, “It may be possible to use as an instrument the lagged value of the independent variable in 
question; it is usually correlated with the original independent variable, and, although it is correlated with the 
disturbance vector, because it is lagged it is not contemporaneously correlated with the disturbance (assuming the 
disturbance is not autocorrelated).” We also conduct the Stock and Yogo (2004) and the Hahn and Hausman (2002) 
weak instrument tests on these lagged instruments. 
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Fixed Effects Estimator 
 While we have tried to control for differences across sample firms, unobserved 
heterogeneity across the sample firms can confound our estimated governance-performance 
relation. A similar problem arises if we omit yearly variables that impact firms similarly but 
differently across years. To address these concerns, we estimate the performance-governance 
relationship using OLS with fixed effects estimator including firm and year fixed effects, and  
clustered (Rogers) standard errors. These results are noted in Appendix B and are consistent with 
those reported in Table 4.  
k-class Estimator 
In the case of simultaneously determined variables, 2SLS can address this problem by 
using instrumental variables.  There are estimators other than the 2SLS estimator, such as the k-
class estimator that can address the endogeneity problem; see Kennedy (2003) and Guggenberger 
(2005). The results for k-class estimators and next year’s operating performance, next two years’ 
operating performance, stock return and Tobin’s Q (for contemporaneous and for the two 
additional time periods) as the performance measures are consistent with the results reported in 
Table 4. 
Estimation of Standard Errors 
 Petersen (2009) and Wooldridge (2002) provide a careful analysis of the impact of 
correlated residuals on the bias in standard errors in panel data. While Petersen’s work is quite 
helpful in understanding the standard error estimates for a single equation model, it is unclear 
how his conclusions might apply to a system of simultaneous equations. Note that both the 
economics and econometrics of the performance-governance relationship as analyzed above 
strongly suggest that this relationship needs to be estimated as a system of simultaneous 
  
4 
 
equations. We estimate the performance-governance relationship using 2SLS and 
heteroscedasticity adjusted White and clustered (Rogers) standard errors. These results are 
consistent with those reported earlier.  
Market-to-book in Governance and Ownership Equations 
Market-to-book has been documented as a determinant of ownership structure and board 
structure by Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) and Linck, Netter and Yang (2008), 
respectively. We include market-to-book in equations (1b) and (1c) above and re-estimate 
equations (1a) – (1d). The results are consistent with those reported in Table 4; see Appendix C. 
Accounting Performance Measurement Issue 
One of the main aims of SOX was stronger scrutiny over financial reporting, especially 
with respect to revenue recognition.2 Cohen, Dey and Lys (2005, 2008) document a significant 
change in reporting practices subsequent to the passage of SOX. Changes in reporting practices 
can have a significant effect on ROA. As a robustness check, we control for the changes in 
reporting practices when we consider ROA as the performance measure in equation (1a). We 
measure reporting practices by the level of discretionary accruals, and use the Larcker and 
Richardson (2004) model to estimate discretionary accruals. 
Two separate analyses utilizing the abnormal accruals measure are performed.  In the 
baseline model, the Accruals variable is simply added to equation (1a).  Then, the sample is split 
into low accrual and high-accrual samples, for both pre-SOX and post-SOX periods, using the 
median value of Accruals as the dividing point. For conciseness, only the 2SLS results are 
presented.  Also for conciseness, only the coefficients on the Governance and Accruals variables 
                                                        
2
 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for helping us develop and focus our analysis here. 
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are presented.  Intercepts, year dummies, industry dummies, and all other explanatory variables 
in equation (1) are included but not tabulated.   
Appendix D, Panel A1 (A2) presents the results for all firms for the pre-SOX (post-SOX) 
period. Appendix D, Panel B1 (B2) presents the results for Low Accrual firms for the pre-SOX 
(post-SOX) period.  Appendix D, Panel C1 (C2) presents the results for High Accrual firms for 
the pre-SOX (post-SOX) period. These tables provide evidence that performance-governance 
relationships noted in Table 4 are robust to consideration of accruals as a control variable. 
Alternative ROA Estimates 
Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) note "to the extent that governance affects firm 
performance through capital expenditure programs, depreciation expense is an important 
component of a firm's governance." For this reason, we also consider operating income after 
depreciation in estimating ROA. The results are consistent with the results in Table 4. 
Director Independence Measurement Issue 
It is possible that firms responded to the new SOX-related director independence rule by 
being more lenient about their definition of director independence.3 Approximately 2.9% of the 
director-years involve a classification change (from “Affiliated” to “Independent,” or vice-
versa).  This results in 1,113 firms-years containing a director classification change.  For 
conciseness, only the 2SLS results and the coefficients on Governance are presented.  Intercepts, 
year dummies, industry dummies, and all other explanatory variables in equation (1) are included 
but not tabulated.   In Appendix E, Panels A and B, equation (1) is estimated on only those firms 
that contain a director classification change in the Pre-SOX and Post-SOX periods.  In Appendix 
E, Panels C and D, equation (1) is estimated on only those firms that do not contain a director 
                                                        
3 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for helping us develop this analysis. 
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classification change in the Pre-SOX and Post-SOX periods.  The performance-governance 
relationships are consistent with those reported in Table 4. 
Firm Size and the Performance-Governance Relation 
 The performance-governance relationship could be sensitive to firm size for two reasons. 
First, SOX exempts firms with market capitalization less than $75 million. Second, Linck, Netter 
and Yang (2008) find that board structure determinants vary cross-sectionally with firm size. The 
first concern is not quite relevant for this study since less than 0.8% of sample firms have market 
capitalization less than $75 million in 2002; in 2006 all sample firms have market capitalization 
greater than $75 million. To address the second concern we estimate the system for five sub-
samples categorized by size. During 1998-2001 (2003-2007) board independence is consistently 
negatively (positively) related to performance for all size quintiles; see Appendix F. 
Information Cost and the Performance-Governance Relation 
 In a recent paper, Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) argue that increasing board 
independence does not improve performance when the high cost of obtaining useful information 
about the firm precludes efficient monitoring.4  When the cost of information is low, firm 
performance is positively related to board independence. Following Duchin, Matsusaka and 
Ozbas, we construct an Information Cost index – “IC_Index”.  We gather data on number of 
analysts following each firm (number of unique analysts’ forecasts), on the dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts (standard deviation of forecasts, divided by assets), and on the analyst 
forecast error (absolute difference between the mean analyst earnings forecast and the actual 
earnings, divided by assets).  Firms are ranked from ‘best’ to ‘worst’ on each measure (high 
number of analysts, low dispersion and low error are considered ‘best’).  Each firm’s percentile 
                                                        
4 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for helping us develop this insight. 
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ranking on each measure are averaged and scaled between zero and one, with one representing 
the highest amount of information. For conciseness, only the 2SLS results are presented.  
Further, only the 2 primary variables of interest are presented: the Governance variable, and the 
interactive Governance x IC_Index variable.  Intercepts, year dummies, industry dummies, and 
all other explanatory variables in equation (1) are included but not tabulated.  Appendix G, Panel 
A presents the results for the pre-SOX period, 1998-2001, and Panel B presents the results for 
the post-SOX period, 2003-2007.   
Including the Governance x IC_Index interactive term does not change the tenor of any of 
our results.  The interactive term – for all variables and for both periods – shows that low 
information costs and improvements in governance are associated with superior firm 
performance.5   
R&D Heterogeneity and the Performance-Governance Relation 
 Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2008) suggest that R&D intensive firms benefit more from 
boards that include less independent directors (and correspondingly, more inside directors).  
In Appendix H, Panel A we analyze firms with below median R&D intensity and in Panel B we 
analyze firms with above median R&D intensity (R&D intensity measured by R&D expenses 
divided by assets).  For conciseness, only the results from the 2SLS analyses are presented.  Also 
for conciseness, only the coefficients on the Governance variable from equation (1a) are 
                                                        
5 Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) consider the period 2000-2005, and do not find a significant relation between 
board independence and firm performance. When we consider the period 2000-2005 for our sample, we also 
estimate an insignificant relation between board independence and firm performance; see Appendix G, Panel C. 
Perhaps the insignificant result for 2000-2005 can be attributed to combining the negative independence-
performance relation in the pre-SOX period and the positive  independence-performance relation in the post-SOX 
period. 
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presented, with p-values below in parentheses. The governance-performance relationships noted 
in Appendix H are consistent with those reported in Table 4. Additionally, the evidence supports 
the arguments in Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), that R&D intensive firms benefit more from 
boards that include less independent directors. 
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Appendix A: Endogeneity and Instrument Validity Tests 
 
Hausman (1978) test for endogeneity – This tests for differences between the OLS and IV 
estimates.  The test statistic normalizes the differences in coefficients by the differences in 
standard errors.  Large differences between OLS and IV will result in large test statistics and low 
p-values, suggesting that endogeneity is a problem and that the IV results are more consistent 
than OLS results. 
Stock and Yogo (2004) test for weak instruments – This test evaluates the strength of the 
first stage regression by considering the F-statistic of the reduced form first stage regression of 
excluded instruments.  High F-statistics and low p-values suggest strong instruments. 
Hahn and Hausman (2002) test for instrument validity – This test is a variation of the 
Hausman (1978) test for endogeneity, applied to the instruments rather than the specification.  
This test compares the ‘forward’ and ‘reverse’ IV estimates.  If the instruments are valid, the 
difference between the ‘forward’ and the inverse of the ‘reverse’ estimates should be small, 
leading to large test statistics and small p-values. 
Cragg-Donald (1993) – This is a test of underidentification.  The Stock and Yogo (2004) 
test was, in part, derived from this test.  If the Cragg-Donald F-statistic is below the critical 
value, or the p-value is high, the instruments are deemed to be weak. 
Hansen-Sargan – This is a test for overidentifying restrictions, testing the joint 
significance of the set of endogenous variables in the system of equations.  It has a Chi-square 
distribution (with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of 
parameters), and the null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid.  Large p-values suggest that 
the instruments are valid. 
Anderson-Rubin  – This is a test of the joint significance of a set of endogenous variables 
in a system of equations.  It tests for the joint significance of the excluded instruments by 
essentially substituting the first-stage reduced-form equations into the second-stage structural 
equations.  The test statistic has a Chi-square distribution; large test statistics and small p-values 
suggest instrument validity and joint significance of the system. 
Shea (1997) Partial R2 – This test provides the partial R2 for the excluded instruments on 
the fitted value of the endogenous regressors.  Higher partial R2 values are deemed to represent 
valid instruments, although there is no formal test statistic. 
 
Instruments: For each governance variable, we utilize two of three instruments for our 
governance variables.  Dir%Own is the average percentage of common stock owned by all 
directors.  Dir%CEOs is the percentage of directors who are CEOs.  Dir%15Ten is the 
percentage of directors who have served on the board form at least 15 years. Dir%Own is used as 
an instrument for all governance variables.  Dir%CEOs is used as an instrument for 
Independence, DirectorOwn, and CEO-Duality; Dir%15Ten is used as an instrument for G-Index 
and E-Index. 
TreasStock is the ratio of treasury stock to assets, which we use as the instrument for 
performance.    CEOTenAge is the ratio of CEO tenure to CEO age; this variable is used as the 
instrument for ownership.  ZScore is the modified Altman’s Z-Score; this variable is used as the 
instrument for leverage. 
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APPENDIX A TABLE 
Endogeneity and Instrument Validity Tests 
 
This table presents the results from performing our endogeneity and weak instruments tests in estimating equation (1a).  The p-values from each test are given.  
Brief descriptions of each test are given above.  The results are given considering 5 different measures of governance, and considering 3 different time periods 
for measuring operating performance: Contemporaneous ROA,  Next Year’s ROA, and Next Two Years’ ROA.  The governance variables are Board 
Independence, Median Director Dollar Ownership, CEO-Chair Duality, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) G-Index, and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) E-
Index.  The Hausman (1978) is a test for endogeneity, comparing the OLS and IV results; the other tests in this table are various forms of evaluating the strength 
and/or relevance of the instruments used in the instrumental variables analyses.  For the Stock and Yogo (2004) test and the Shea Partial R2, the p-values are 
given for each first-stage equation.  For the other tests, the p-value pertains to the entire system. 
   
Dependent Variable: 
Contemporaneous ROA  
Dependent Variable:  
Next Year’s ROA  
Dependent Variable:  
Next Two Years’ ROA 
   1998-2001 2003-2007  1998-2001 2003-2007  1998-2001 2003-2007 
Independencet         
 
Hausman Test 0.004 0.002  0.007 0.002  0.005 0.003 
 
          
 
Stock & Yogo         
 
 Governance 0.007 0.004  0.013 0.012  0.016 0.023 
 
 Ownership 0.019 0.004  0.037 0.006  0.047 0.012 
 
 Leverage 0.046 0.113  0.020 0.010  0.036 0.054 
 
          
 
Hahn & Hausman 0.020 0.043  0.006 0.025  0.048 0.001 
 
          
 
Cragg-Donald 0.001 0.004  0.012 0.007  0.009 0.007 
 
          
 
Hansen-Sargan 0.847 0.902  0.473 0.605  0.352 0.506 
 
          
 
Anderson-Rubin 0.036 0.039  0.025 0.045  0.059 0.054 
 
          
 
Shea Partial R2         
 
 Governance 0.231 0.404  0.264 0.244  0.187 0.277 
 
 Ownership 0.330 0.360  0.220 0.302  0.143 0.189 
  Leverage 0.308 0.332  0.264 0.302  0.220 0.291 
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Dependent Variable: 
Contemporaneous ROA  
Dependent Variable:  
Next Year’s ROA  
Dependent Variable: 
 Next Two Years’ ROA 
   1998-2001 2003-2007  1998-2001 2003-2007  1998-2001 2003-2007 
DirectorOwnt         
 Hausman Test 0.001 0.004  0.002 0.001  0.006 0.007 
           
 Stock & Yogo         
  Governance 0.002 0.003  0.015 0.004  0.007 0.011 
  Ownership 0.004 0.023  0.028 0.031  0.003 0.018 
  Leverage 0.004 0.045  0.029 0.095  0.148 0.130 
           
 Hahn & Hausman 0.074 0.046  0.008 0.020  0.034 0.064 
           
 Cragg-Donald 0.002 0.000  0.008 0.004  0.006 0.004 
           
 Hansen-Sargan 0.737 0.671  0.253 0.616  0.209 0.220 
           
 Anderson-Rubin 0.060 0.033  0.024 0.016  0.083 0.026 
           
 Shea Partial R2         
  Governance 0.264 0.288  0.231 0.230  0.154 0.175 
  Ownership 0.297 0.432  0.220 0.273  0.220 0.248 
  Leverage 0.308 0.346  0.187 0.359  0.198 0.204 
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Dependent Variable: 
Contemporaneous ROA  
Dependent Variable:  
Next Year’s ROA  
Dependent Variable:  
Next Two Years’ ROA 
   1998-2001 2003-2007  1998-2001 2003-2007  1998-2001 2003-2007 
CEO-Dualityt         
 Hausman Test 0.007 0.004  0.007 0.005  0.011 0.009 
           
 Stock & Yogo         
  Governance 0.005 0.007  0.016 0.010  0.010 0.016 
  Ownership 0.008 0.018  0.027 0.019  0.022 0.025 
  Leverage 0.038 0.055  0.029 0.055  0.067 0.073 
           
 Hahn & Hausman 0.021 0.039  0.023 0.018  0.046 0.033 
           
 Cragg-Donald 0.002 0.007  0.007 0.004  0.008 0.007 
           
 Hansen-Sargan 0.552 0.586  0.275 0.414  0.266 0.312 
           
 Anderson-Rubin 0.041 0.024  0.021 0.026  0.048 0.032 
           
 Shea Partial R2         
  Governance 0.244 0.342  0.216 0.212  0.166 0.217 
  Ownership 0.268 0.360  0.207 0.263  0.169 0.219 
  Leverage 0.257 0.324  0.209 0.287  0.162 0.192 
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Dependent Variable: 
Contemporaneous ROA  
Dependent Variable:  
Next Year’s ROA  
Dependent Variable:  
Next Two Years’ ROA 
   1998-2001 2003-2007  1998-2001 2003-2007  1998-2001 2003-2007 
G-Indext         
 Hausman Test 0.001 0.000  0.005 0.005  0.008 0.002 
           
 Stock & Yogo         
  Governance 0.003 0.004  0.019 0.005  0.003 0.009 
  Ownership 0.006 0.027  0.005 0.036  0.017 0.034 
  Leverage 0.019 0.021  0.015 0.051  0.014 0.045 
           
 Hahn & Hausman 0.017 0.066  0.058 0.015  0.026 0.047 
           
 Cragg-Donald 0.003 0.003  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.004 
           
 Hansen-Sargan 0.341 0.649  0.231 0.242  0.165 0.352 
           
 Anderson-Rubin 0.056 0.018  0.013 0.008  0.042 0.004 
           
 Shea Partial R2         
  Governance 0.297 0.432  0.220 0.230  0.220 0.219 
  Ownership 0.253 0.389  0.275 0.359  0.220 0.291 
  Leverage 0.308 0.418  0.220 0.287  0.154 0.175 
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Dependent Variable: 
Contemporaneous ROA  
Dependent Variable:  
Next Year’s ROA  
Dependent Variable:  
Next Two Years’ ROA 
   1998-2001 2003-2007  1998-2001 2003-2007  1998-2001 2003-2007 
E-Indext         
 Hausman Test 0.002 0.005  0.008 0.008  0.007 0.007 
           
 Stock & Yogo         
  Governance 0.008 0.009  0.013 0.016  0.015 0.024 
  Ownership 0.001 0.014  0.033 0.010  0.030 0.048 
  Leverage 0.086 0.052  0.049 0.082  0.080 0.084 
           
 Hahn & Hausman 0.002 0.007  0.022 0.012  0.079 0.026 
           
 Cragg-Donald 0.001 0.006  0.007 0.002  0.004 0.004 
           
 Hansen-Sargan 0.550 0.418  0.264 0.385  0.451 0.308 
           
 Anderson-Rubin 0.017 0.012  0.016 0.038  0.030 0.051 
           
 Shea Partial R2         
  Governance 0.286 0.418  0.242 0.244  0.176 0.291 
  Ownership 0.319 0.432  0.198 0.230  0.165 0.248 
  Leverage 0.231 0.346  0.264 0.345  0.143 0.189 
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APPENDIX B TABLE 
Fixed Effects Estimation 
 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1a), the performance equation, using fixed effects estimation.  Specifications are presented with five 
different governance variables: Independence, board independence; DirectorOwn, the dollar value of the median director’s stock ownership; CEO-Duality, 
whether or not the CEO is also the board chair; G-Index, the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) Governance Index; and, E-Index, the Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell Entrenchment index.  ROA, return on assets in the current period is used as the measure of performance.  Only the coefficient and corresponding p-value 
for the Governance variable in equation (1a) is presented.  All other variables in equation (1a) are as defined in the text, and are included in the estimation but not 
shown in the Table.  Panel A presents the results for the 1998-2001 period; Panel B presents the results for the 1998-2001 period.  An intercept and year and firm 
fixed effects are also included but not presented.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. Coefficients are presented with p-values below in parentheses.  Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
Panel A: 1998-2001 
     
 
 Fixed Effects Estimation 
  Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
  Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
 Governancet -0.009** 0.004*** -0.002* -0.001* -0.004 
  (0.04) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) (0.20) 
       
 # of Observations 5,156 4,665 5,156 4,566 4,566 
 
 
Panel B: 2003-2007 
     
 
 Fixed Effects Estimation 
  Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
  Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
 Governancet 0.020*** 0.005*** 0.003 -0.002 -0.002** 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.90) (0.11) (0.02) 
       
 # of Observations 6,515 6,377 6,515 7,665 7,665 
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APPENDIX C TABLE 
Market-to-Book in Governance and Ownership Equations 
 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1a), the performance equation, including Market-to-book in governance and ownership equations. 
Specifications are presented with five different governance variables: Independence, board independence; DirectorOwn, the dollar value of the median director’s 
stock ownership; CEO-Duality, whether or not the CEO is also the board chair; G-Index, the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) Governance Index; and, E-Index, 
the Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell Entrenchment index.  ROA, return on assets in the current period is used as the measure of performance.  Only the coefficient 
and corresponding p-value for the Governance variable in equation (1a) is presented.  All other variables in equation (1a) are as defined in the text, and are 
included in the estimation but not shown in the Table.  Panel A presents the results for the 1998-2001 period; Panel B presents the results for the 1998-2001 
period.  An intercept and year and firm fixed effects are also included but not presented.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. Coefficients are presented with p-
values below in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 1998-2001      
  2SLS Estimation 
  Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
  Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
 Governancet -0.441** 0.022*** -0.199*** -0.078** -0.145* 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) 
 
 
Panel B: 2003-2007      
 2SLS Estimation 
 Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
 Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
    Governancet 0.209*** 0.006** -0.106** 0.028 -0.192 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.20) 
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APPENDIX D TABLE 
Accruals and Measurement of Accounting Performance 
 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1a), the performance equation, adding a measure of 
discretionary accruals, Accruals.  Specifications are presented with the five different governance variables.  ROA, 
return on assets in the current period is used as the measure of performance.  Only the coefficients and 
corresponding p-values for the Governance and Accruals variables in equation (1a) are presented for conciseness.  
All other variables in equation (1a) are as defined in the text, and are included in the estimation but not shown in the 
Tables.  Panels A1 and A2 present the results for all firms in the Pre-SOX and Post-SOX periods.  Panels B1 and B2 
present the results for firms with an Accruals value less than the sample median in the Pre-SOX and Post-SOX 
periods.  Panels C1 and C2 present the results for firms with and Accruals value greater than the sample median in 
the Pre-SOX and Post-SOX periods.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A1: All firms, pre-SOX 1998-2001 
 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet -0.369*** 0.015** -0.138*** -0.057*** -0.120** 
(0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
Accrualst -0.036 -0.026 -0.031 -0.024 -0.014 
(0.15) (0.28) (0.21) (0.44) (0.63) 
# of Observations 3,558 3,558 3,558 3,313 3,313 
 
 
Panel A2: All firms, post-SOX 2003-2007 
 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet 0.367*** 0.092** -0.118*** 0.0368** -0.070** 
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) 
Accrualst 0.030*** 0.032** 0.039** 0.045** 0.041* 
(0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
# of Observations 3,495 3,495 3,495 3,359 3,359 
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Panel B1: Low Accrual firms, pre-SOX 1998-2001 
 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet -0.343*** 0.020*** -0.105*** -0.062*** -0.099*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Accrualst -0.005 -0.052** -0.050* 0.513 0.041 
(0.85) (0.02) (0.06) (0.30) (0.36) 
# of Observations 1,802 1,802 1,802 1,632 1,632 
 
Panel B2: Low Accrual firms, post-SOX 2003-2007 
 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet 0.269*** 0.041** -0.145*** 0.007 -0.009* 
(0.00)  (0.04) (0.00) (0.47) (0.07) 
Accrualst 0.037 0.059** 0.055 0.048* 0.048* 
(0.27) (0.02) (0.17) (0.09) (0.08) 
# of Observations 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,776 1,776 
 
 
Panel C1: High Accrual firms, pre-SOX 1998-2001 
 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet -0.535 0.003* -0.221** -0.014 -0.100 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.03) (0.66) (0.26) 
Accrualst 0.381*** 0.377*** 0.433*** 0.325*** 0.240** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
# of Observations 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,681 1,681 
 
Panel C2: High Accrual firms, post-SOX 2003-2007 
 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet 0.181 0.006** -0.085*** 0.008 -0.101*** 
(0.11) (0.04) (0.00) (0.32) (0.04) 
Accrualst 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.090*** 0.073*** 0.040 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) 
# of Observations 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,783 1,783 
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APPENDIX E TABLE 
Governance and Performance, Equation (1a), by Director Classification 
 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1a), the performance equation, on two different sub-
samples: those firms which had an individual director’s classification change from year-to-year and those firms 
which did not have such a director classification change.  A director classification change would be a director 
changing from Independent to Affiliated, or vice versa.  Specifications are presented with the five different 
governance variables.  ROA, return on assets in the current period is used as the measure of performance.  Only 
the coefficient and corresponding p-value for the Governance variable in equation (1a) is presented.  All other 
variables in equation (1a) are as defined in the text, and are included in the estimation but not shown in the 
Table.  Panel A presents the results for the firms that did have a director change during the 1998-2001 period; 
Panel B presents the results for the firms that did have a director change during the 1998-2001 period; Panel C 
presents the results for the firms that did not have a director change during the 1998-2001 period; Panel D 
presents the results for the firms that did not have a director change during the 1998-2001 period.  An intercept 
and year and firm fixed effects are also included but not presented.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Coefficients are presented with p-values below in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firms with Director Classification Changes, Pre-SOX, 1998-2001 
 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet -0.227* 0.020* 0.066 -0.031 -0.067** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.33) (0.14) (0.01) 
 
Panel B: Firms with Director Classification Changes, Post-SOX, 2003-2007 
 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet 0.171 0.010* -0.377 0.023 -0.063* 
(0.19) (0.06) (0.45) (0.24) (0.07) 
 
 
Panel C: Firms with NO Classification Changes, Pre-SOX, 1998-2001 
 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet -0.437** 0.018** -0.210*** -0.088*** -0.201** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
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Panel D: Firms with NO Classification Changes, Post-SOX, 2003-2007 
 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet 0.266*** 0.011* -0.117*** 0.045** -0.221 
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.31) 
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APPENDIX F TABLE 
Board Independence on Performance by Size Quintile 
 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1a) with Independence as the governance variable by 
quintiles sorted by the market value of equity. Only the coefficient and corresponding p-value on Independence, the 
Governance variable in equation (1a) is presented.  All other variables in equation (1a) are as defined in the text, and 
are included in the estimation but not shown in the Table.  The smallest firms are in Quintile 1; the largest firms are 
in Quintile 5. ROA is the performance variable. The Mean MVE shows the average market value of equity for each 
quintile.  Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation is used.  Panel A presents the results for the 1998-2001 
period; Panel B presents the results for the 2003-2007 period.  An intercept and year and industry dummy variables 
are included but not presented.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  Coefficients are presented with p-values 
below in parentheses.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: 1998-2001 
     
 
 2LS Estimation 
  Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
  Smallest Firms----------Sorted by Market Value of Equity----------Largest Firms 
  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 Independencet -0.124 -0.353 -0.082 -0.157 -0.026* 
  (0.18) (0.11) (0.23) (0.10) (0.08) 
       
 Mean MVE (millions) $185.6 $643.3 $1,435.6 $3,555.7 $14,508.1 
 # of Observations 1,028 1,027 1,027 1,028 1,027 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: 2003-2007 
     
 
 2LS Estimation 
  Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
  Smallest Firms----------Sorted by Market Value of Equity----------Largest Firms 
  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
 Independencet 0.561** 0.227 0.082 0.104** 0.120** 
  (0.05) (0.13) (0.14) (0.05) (0.02) 
       
 Mean MVE (millions) $455.3 $1,077.3 $2,206.6 $5,036.3 $18,447.8 
 # of Observations 1,301 1,300 1,300 1,301 1,301 
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APPENDIX G TABLE 
Information Cost and the Governance-Performance Relation 
 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1a), the performance equation, adding a measure of the cost 
of information at each firm.  Following Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) we construct an Information Cost 
index: IC_Index.  Higher measures of IC_Index are associated with higher levels of information.  We combine the 
IC_Index with each of the five different governance variables to create an interactive term, Governance x IC_Index.  
ROA, return on assets in the current period is used as the measure of performance.  Only the coefficients and 
corresponding p-values for the Governance and Governance x IC_Index variables in equation (1a) are presented for 
conciseness.  All other variables in equation (1a) are as defined in the text, and are included in the estimation but not 
shown in the Tables.  Panel A presents the results during the pre-SOX period; Panel B presents the results during the 
post-SOX period; and, Panel C presents the results from the original equation (1a), excluding the IC_Index term, 
during the Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas time period, 2000-2005.  Standard errors are clustered by firm. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Information cost analysis, pre-SOX 1998-2001 
 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet -0.866*** 0.017** -0.660** -0.173** -0.629** 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Governance x 
IC_Indext 
-0.771*** -0.009*** 0.990*** 0.149** 0.840** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) 
 
 
Panel B: Information cost analysis, post-SOX 2003-2007 
 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet 0.847*** 0.002* -0.017* 0.078 -0.094** 
(0.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.01) 
Governance x 
IC_Indext 
-0.441*** -0.001 0.012 0.057*** 0.123 
(0.00) (0.13) (0.86) (0.00) (0.12) 
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Panel C: Equation (1a), Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) period 2000-2005  
 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets (ROAt) 
Independencet DirectorOwnt CEO-Dualityt G-Indext E-Indext 
Governancet 0.3164 0.024*** -0.519*** -0.022 -0.673*** 
(0.28) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) 
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APPENDIX H TABLE 
R&D Heterogeneity and the Performance-Governance Relation 
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1a), the performance equation, on two sub-samples based 
on R&D intensity, measured by R&D expense divided by assets.  Specifications are presented with the five different 
governance variables.  ROA, return on assets in the current period is used as the measure of performance.  Only the 
coefficient and corresponding p-value for the Governance variable in equation (1a) is presented for conciseness.  All 
other variables in equation (1a) are as defined in the text, and are included in the estimation but not shown in the 
Tables.  Panels A presents the results for firms with R&D intensity below the sample median for both pre-SOX and 
post-SOX periods; Panel B presents the results for firms with R&D intensity above the sample median for both pre-
SOX and post-SOX periods; and Panel C compares the coefficient value across the two R&D intensity sub-samples 
for just the Board Independence regression.  In Panels A and B, the governance coefficients are compared pre-SOX 
to post-SOX.  *** indicates different from pre-SOX to post-SOX at the 1% level, ** indicates different at the 5% 
level and * indicates different at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A: R&D intensity, below median 
 
  Governance Pre-SOX: 1998-2001 Post-SOX: 2003-2007 
  
  
Independence 
-0.455 0.617***   
  
  (0.000) (0.004)   
  
DirectorOwn 0.036 0.008*   
  
  (0.000) (0.068)   
  
CEO-Duality 
-0.113 -0.067   
  
  (0.000) (0.001)   
  
GIM G-Index 
-0.018 -0.012   
  
  (0.068) (0.072)   
  
BCF E-Index 
-0.225 -0.196   
  
  (0.000) (0.150)   
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Panel B: R&D intensity, above median 
 
  Governance Pre-SOX: 1998-2001 Post-SOX: 2003-2007 
  
  
Independence 
-0.516 0.179***   
  
  (0.064) (0.114)   
  
DirectorOwn 0.038 0.007   
  
  (0.011) (0.039)   
  
CEO-Duality 
-0.147 -0.104   
  
  (0.071) (0.215)   
  
GIM G-Index 
-0.020 0.015***   
  
  (0.506) (0.355)   
  
BCF E-Index 
-0.130 0.039***   
  
  (0.247) (0.303)   
 
Panel C: Comparison of Board Independence coefficients, below median vs. above median 
 
  Board Independence Pre-SOX: 1998-2001 Post-SOX: 2003-2007 
  
  
Below Median 
-0.455 0.617   
  
  (0.000) (0.004)   
  
Above Median 
-0.516* 0.179***   
  
  (0.064) (0.114)   
 
